# Leprosy NEG File

## Case

### Incoherent Metaphor

#### Leper is not subject to bare life and the aff’s usage of metaphor is violent.

Edmond 6 (Rod Edmond, July 2006, Professor of Modern Literature and Cultural History at University of Kent, United Kingdom, “Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History”, Cambridge University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497285>, pg. 13) //SJK

Here, too, there are problems. The cultural historians and theorists I am discussing write in the shadow of Foucault. Indeed Homo Sacer offers itself as a supplement to Foucault, arguing the need to complete his inquiry into the grand renfermement of hospitals and prisons that, for Agamben, should have culminated in those exemplary places of modern biopolitics, the concentration camp and the totalitarian state.45 Even Edward Said’s Orientalism, that founding text of postcolonial studies, is also very consciously a supplement to Foucault’s analysis of the operation of power from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Foucault’s neglect of the colonial dimension of his archaeology of modernity, however, cannot simply be compensated by inference or supplement. The difficulties it presents run much deeper, as Ann Laura Stoler has shown.46 This is a matter I shall return to later. The Foucauldian tradition can also too readily see renfermement wherever it looks, while forgetting the paradoxical ways in which Foucault understood power as having operated through this period and into our own. Tempting as it is to exploit the ease with which ‘the leper’ so readily becomes the ideal type of concepts such as Kristeva’s abjection and Agamben’s bare life, the reality for lepers in the modern period was often more complex. As we shall see, mid-nineteenthcentury metropolitan medicine resisted the idea that lepers should be isolated and lose their human rights, and was supported in this by British governments of the time. Agamben argues that within the biopolitical horizon that characterizes modernity, the physician and the scientist supervise the camps of bare life, 47 but the integration of medicine with politics he is indicating was also resisted by liberal medicine for much of the nineteenth century. And in the eyes of the missionary sent out to run a leper colony, Agamben’s space of exception was the ante-room to a place of especial privilege with God. In other words, for much of the nineteenth century ‘the leper’ was less an emblem of bare life than a contested prototype of an emergent biopolitics. My aim is to historicise the processes that Foucauldian cultural history and theory conceptualise, and to suggest they were not always as totalitarian and clear-cut as Gilroy and Agamben, for example, assume. Reading back from the Nazi concentration camps into the nineteenth century can imply a more lethal biopolitics than is always strictly justified. This is not to deny many of the lines of continuity that Gilroy and Agamben trace, but to suggest a more conflicted genealogy and a more nuanced history. This argument will be picked up in later chapters. These matters have a particular bearing on the kind of medico-cultural history I am attempting. Foucault’s explorations of marginality have had a special appeal for interdisciplinary scholars, particularly for those practising history at its boundaries whose infringements have often been resisted by academic historians.48 There has been closely related border tension around the fringes of the history of medicine. This has been well discussed by Roger Cooter, who describes how on the one hand the historian of medicine has concentrated on the historical context of biomedical knowledge and practice, while, on the other, the literary-somatic turn in cultural studies has resulted in the appropriation of the body as a crucial element in the attempt at writing a conceptual history of modernity.49 In a less polarised summary of this field he describes ‘an intellectually and methodologically motley traffic of social, literary and cultural historians and critics pursuing, and ...reproblematising, the politics of the body and its representations’.50 Despite his relative even-handedness, Cooter, a historian of medicine himself, is critical of the ‘historical emptiness’ he discerns in much literary-cultural ‘body-work’: ‘One ends up with myriad revelations well described and often arresting, but no explanation either of the genesis or the context in which particular discourses are sustained. Aesthetics prevail.’ And as he puts it more acerbically, by exceptionalising and homogenising biomedicine, these ‘literary champions of the discursive’ produce ‘fictitious (if critically convenient) harmonious translations ... between alleged social and scientific domains’.51

These strictures are not unfair. The somatic turn in Foucauldian-influenced literary and cultural studies has resulted in some facile analogies between the medical, the social and the ideological, the product of free-floating metaphor rather than materially grounded history; whereas some recent medical history of more conventional-seeming appearance has found ways of avoiding the narrative of progress that the history of medicine has often found difficult to escape, and employed versions of the indeterminacy favoured in theory, if not always in practice, by literary somaticians. One such is Michael Worboys’ Spreading Germs (2000), which demonstrates that the concept of ‘germs’ lacked any fixity of meaning in the period leading up to the development of bacteriology, and that even after this there was no ‘single bacterial model for germs or their actions in any branch of the profession’.52 Worboys’ scrupulous investigation of germ ideas and practices in the second half of the nineteenth century should be an important check on metaphorically inclined cultural critics who see infection, contagion and invasion wherever they look. Only in the 1890s, Worboys argues, was the ‘military analogy of invading germs in conflict with the body’s defences’ becoming widely used.53 Yet a history such as Worboys’ is confined to the medical profession and its local cultures, and there is every reason for historians and others of a more broadly cultural inclination to examine the ubiquity of disease and infection language in this period and beyond. The task should be to try and bring these different worlds into more considered relation with each other.

#### Don’t buy their totalizing claims – metaphors of leprosy assume a single disease that caused exlcusoion—their analysis is based on the flawed assumptions of the nature of leprosy.

Edmond 6 (Rod Edmond, July 2006, Professor of Modern Literature and Cultural History at University of Kent, United Kingdom, “Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History”, Cambridge University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497285>, pages 5-6) //SJK

Already there are problems with my discussion. Does the leprosy of Leviticus, of fourteenth-century France and twentieth-century Hawaii describe the same clinical entity? And does the concern of the Leviticus writer, the panic of late medieval southern French society, and the fear of the anti-communist investigator derive from some common transhistorical Judeo-Christian revulsion at the disease, or does each of these instances have a historical specificity that makes it misleading to run them together in the way that I have so far been doing? The simple answer to the first of these questions is almost certainly not. Even within the Bible, the symptoms of leprosy in Leviticus are different, for example, from those described by Aaron in Numbers. The Leviticus writer is concerned with blemishes of the skin, and there is no equivalent of the account in Numbers, which describes it as a condition in which the flesh is ‘half consumed’ (12: 12). Mary Douglas argues that Leviticus’s description suggests not one but various skin diseases, including skin cancer, psoriasis, tropical ulcers, yaws, and major infectious diseases such as smallpox or measles.14 In medieval and early modern Europe leprosy was very often a generic term for a wide range of skin diseases and, clinically speaking, it is only in the early nineteenth century that a sustained attempt was begun to distinguish leprosy from other skin disorders, and to distinguish between different types of leprosy itself. That said, the Leviticus writer is obsessively concerned with establishing ‘true leprosy’ and with distinguishing it fromothersuperficiallysimilardiseases.Andforallthatleprosycontinued to be run together with other skin diseases, it was also imperative to differentiate a disease that was believed to be highly contagious and whose consequences for the sufferer were so serious. Accurate diagnosis was, on the one hand, impossible, and on the other, essential. Versions of this dilemma haunted the disease until well into the twentieth century. Does a constant set of causes underlie the apparent continuity of response to leprosy since biblical times? For a medical scientist such as Olaf K. Skinsnes, leprosy is a disease with a unique medical pathology that produces a unique social response; a constant set of causes results in an identical stigma wherever the disease appears.15 And a literary critic like Nathaniel Brady also sees the resurfacing of fears about leprosy in Europe in the nineteenth century, after centuries during which the disease had virtually disappeared, as testimony to its constant power as an emblem of sin and moral decay.16 For Zachary Gussow, however, to regard the reaction to leprosy as a psychological and cultural constant is to augment the very process being described and to endorse the idea of the long unchanging history of leprosy’s taint; ‘[h]umanity’s dread is termed a natural response’, and leprosy becomes perpetually identified with stigma. Biblical tradition and the literary imagination, he suggests, have been particularly important in sustaining this account of the history of the disease.17 Gussow himself denies the universality of both the response and its causes, arguing that leprosy was ‘retainted’ in the modern colonial period; around the turn of the twentieth century it was transformed from ‘a feared clinical entity’ into ‘a stigmatised phenomenon’.18 He sees a number of interlocking reasons for this: the discovery of the leprosy bacillus in 1874 which offered scientific support for those who argued the disease was contagious rather than hereditary; the belief that leprosy was racially selective, and had become a tropical rather than a European disease; the movement of indentured labour around the world following the abolition of slavery, and consequent fear of the disease spreading; and the organised involvement of Western missionaries in leprosy work in the wake of the expansion of European empires.19 This approach is clearly more satisfactory than trans-historical and trans-cultural explanations that see the fear of leprosy as constant and unchanging. The idea of ‘retainting’ also fits the sequence proposed by Foucault in which leprosy disappeared from the Western world at the end of the Middle Ages, with criminals and the insane taking the part previously played by the leper.20 Gussow builds on some of the possibilities opened up by Foucault’s argument.21 There are, however, significant differences between the two. Gussow treats modern leprosy almost as if it were a new disease, although he declines to be drawn into the question of the continuity or otherwise of biblical and medieval leprosy with its modern forms.22 In terms of its stigmatisation he insistently emphasises discontinuity: ‘It is unnecessary to search the human psyche deeply or to reach far back into history to account for modern lepraphobia. A close look at the expanding Western world during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suffices.’23

### Post-Panopticism

#### The metaphor of the Panopticon is no longer applicable – we live in the era of post-panopticism

Boyne 2000 (Roy Boyne is the Emeritus Professor in the Department of Sociology at Durham College, “Post-Panopticism,” <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/030851400360505> ///ghs-sc)

According to Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis, the ‘“Panoptic” model of securing and perpetuating social order’ is now defunct. He argues that it was quite appropriate for armies of workers and infantrymen, who were shaped by policing and indoctrination, but is now inappropriate in societies shaped by consumption and enjoyment imperatives. He writes: Most of us are socially and culturally trained and shaped as sensation-seekers and gatherers, rather than producers and soldiers. Constant openness for new sensations and greed for ever new experience, always stronger and deeper than before, is a condition sine qua non of being amenable to seduction. It is not ‘health’ with its connotation of a steady state, of an immobile target on which all properly trained bodies converge – but ‘fitness’, implying being always on the move or ready to move, capacity for imbibing and digesting ever-greater volumes of stimuli, exibility and resistance to all closure, that grasps the quality expected from the experience-collector, the quality that indeed she or he must possess to seek and absorb sensations. (Bauman 1999: 23) For Bauman, then, the dream of total control, exemplied by the Panopticon, is really fully applicable only within a ‘clockwork’ society, whose inhabitants are required to have xed places, functions and appetites. ‘Advanced Western’ societies are not like this. Bauman’s analysis is persuasive inside those areas of contemporary society where hunger for movement is, oxymoronically, a required luxury. His analysis is, however, just a little too deeply impressed by a tendency which can also be seen, mutatis mutandis, in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, a tendency slightly to over-generalize the condition of what Bourdieu called the ‘fun ethic’ of the ‘rising petit-bourgeoisie’ (Bourdieu 1984: 365–71). Memorably, Bauman has written of ‘tourists and vagabonds’, ‘globals and locals’, inhabitants of a new st and a new second world: For the inhabitants of the rst world – the increasingly cosmopolitan, extraterritorial world of global businessmen, global culture managers or global academics, state borders are levelled down, as they are dismantled for the world’s commodities, capital and nances. For the inhabitant of the second world, the walls built of immigration controls, of residence laws, and of ‘clean streets’ and ‘zero tolerance’ policies, grow taller; the moats separating them from the sites of their desire and of dreamed-of redemption grow deeper, while all bridges, at the rst attempt to cross them, prove to be drawbridges. (Bauman 1998: 89) In Bauman’s view, in the hydraulic era of mass armies and huge workforces, the Panopticon could quite properly be seen as a ‘diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form’ (Foucault 1979: 205), as the conceptual essence of interior regulation. Now, however, in the new era of two worlds, the vanishing point of the Panoptical gaze is no longer in the middle but has moved to the edges. The dream life of surveillance is no longer conveyed by the Panopticon. It is now enshrined in the science ction of the force eld. The prime function of surveillance in the contemporary era is border control. We do not care who is out there or what they are doing. We want to see only those who are entitled to enter. Panoptical surveillance was formerly a model for the whole of society, Bauman’s work seems to suggest, but now its power is diminished as its context has been lost.

### Metaphor Bad

#### Using leprosy as a metaphor hurts actual people living with the disease

UN OHCHR 18 (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is a United Nations agency that works to promote and protect human rights, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the elimination of discrimination against persons affected by leprosy and their family members,” May 25 2018, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session38/Documents/A_HRC_38_42_EN.docx> ///ghs-sc)

25. Leprosy came to embody what was socially prescribed as shameful and disrupting, and was thus rendered something beyond a mere disease. It became a symbol, a powerful metaphor, for everything that should be kept apart, whether it was attributed to punishment for sinful conduct, unregulated behaviour, past offences and socially constructed ideas of racial inferiority, among others. 26. Persons affected by leprosy have historically been deprived of their civic, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Women, men and children affected by leprosy were, and continue to be in many contexts, denied not only their dignity, but also an acknowledgement of their humanity. It is not a coincidence that it is commonly said that persons affected by leprosy experience a civil death. They have been consistently subjected to: stigmatizing language; segregation; separation from their families and within the household; separation from their children; denial of care; denial of the means of subsistence; denial of a place to live; denial of education; denial of the right to own property; impediments to marry; impediments to have children; restrictions on their freedom of movement; denial of their right to participate in community, public and political life; physical and psychological abuse and violence; compulsory internment; forced sterilization; institutionalized silencing and invisibility; and removal from history. 27. The use of leprosy as a metaphor bedevils us in public and private spaces. Its stigmatizing effects restrain the social participation of not only those affected by leprosy, but also their families. Yet, it has been imagined as something that no longer exists, something of the past, something remote, something that is still and always apart. 28. It is in this context that persons affected by leprosy and their family members continue to face endless stigmatization and discrimination in their households, communities and societies and in legislative and juridical institutions.

#### The metaphorical use of leprosy reinforces the social controls used to oppress those bodies

Benabeu-Mestre and Ballester-Artigues, 04(Josep Bernabeu-Mestre works in the Department of Public Health at the University of Alicante, Teresa Ballester-Artigues works at Historiador Chabas’ High School of Denia, “Disease as a Metaphorical Resource: The Fontilles Philanthropic Initiative in the Fight Against Leprosy, 1901–1932,” December 1 2004, <https://academic.oup.com/shm/article/17/3/409/1718694> ///ghs-sc)

The worsening of the leprosy problem in Spain during the final decades of the nineteenth century and the initial decades of the twentieth century made it possible for missionary and philanthropic activities to recover one of the most productive parables of charity. Medical care for leprosy patients became a monopoly of religious organizations and charity associations. A social imagery was generated around those initiatives in which the metaphorical dimension of the disease reinforced social control mechanisms through lepers' exclusion and segregation. On the basis of the study of the philanthropic initiative that led to the opening of the Fontilles (Vall de Laguar, Alicante, Spain) leper colony in 1909, this paper analyses the key aspects explaining those images as well as their consequences.

### Reject Leper PIK

#### Reject the term leprosy – it increases stigma.

Edmond 6 (Rod Edmond, July 2006, Professor of Modern Literature and Cultural History at University of Kent, United Kingdom, “Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History”, Cambridge University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497285>, page 63) //SJK

Milroy continued on his tour, but with an altered agenda. As he travelled from British Guiana to Barbados, Antigua, Trinidad, Dominica and Jamaica, Milroy was alarmed to discover that the 1867 Report was virtually unknown. It ‘had been seen by very few; most of the medical men even had not read it ...It seemed as if not above two or three copies had ever reached each colony; in more than one, the Government offices were without a copy.’7 Milroy’s task now became one of spreading the word according to the College of Physicians to a superstitious and incredulous colonial world. Throughout his tour he drummed home the message that leprosy was hereditary and not contagious, and therefore that strict isolation was unwarranted and the neglect of patients inhumane. He wanted lepers to be treated alongside other chronically ill patients, and for the ‘leprosy’ label to be dropped from the title of institutions:

As long as the terms ‘leper’, ‘leprosy’, are continually being repeated, it will be very difficult to disabuse the public mind of the dread and aversion which the words have hitherto suggested. These feelings have led to the perpetuation of opinions which, on strict investigation, have been shown to be the offspring of mere traditional belief rather than of unprejudiced observation.8

Another theme of Milroy’s Report, and one that grew from more than his distaste for incarceration, was the need for lepers to be put to work:‘ it is the want of will, much more than the want of ability, that generally lies at the root of the inaction and indolence of leprous patients ...Even when great mutilation of the extremities exists, it is surprising how much the poor sufferers can do if they are but willing to make the effort.’9 This aim, however, was frustrated by the ‘superstitious’ horror of the disease that Milroy so deplored. In Trinidad Asylum, for example, where Milroy was impressed to discover that work-therapy had been introduced, the public refused to purchase or use articles made by lepers for fear of infection.10

### Theory of Language

#### Their theory of language ignores that public persuasion and collective action actually work sometimes—our interpretation of language is superior and largely compatible with theirs, accounting for action where their theory fails

PETERS 1999 (John Durham, prof of communication at Iowa, Speaking Into the Air, pp. 21-22, 7/18/18)

The task today, I will argue, is to renounce the dream of communication while retaining the goods it invokes. To say that communication in the sense of shared minds is impossible is not to say that we cannot cooperate splendidly. (This was precisely Dewey's point.) On the other hand, to point to the pervasiveness of pragmatic coordination is also not to say that no abysses loom in the self and the other. (This was precisely Heidegger's point.) Habermas, to my taste, underplays the strangeness of language; his French foes such as Derrida (himself importantly influenced by Levinas) underplay its instrumentality. Each of the Dewey-Habermas and Heidegger-Levinas-Derrida lineages grasps impor- tant truths about communication that are inaccessible to the propagan- dists, semanticists, and solipsists in our midst, but neither has quite the full palette of colors. The one position has too much gravity while the other floats in a zero-gravity chamber. Habermas's sobriety misses what Charles Sanders Peirce called the play of musement; Derrida's revelry misses the ordinariness of talk.

The task is to find an account of communication that erases neither the curious fact of otherness at its core nor the possibility of doing things with words. Language is resistant to our intent and often, in Hei- degger's phrase, speaks us; but it is also the most reliable means of peruasion we know. Though language is a dark vessel that does not quite carry what I, as a speaking self, might think it does, it still manages to coordinate action more often than not. This middle position is repre- sented in recent debates by Paul Ricoeur and Hans-Georg Gadamer, but I also want to identify it with a pragmatism open to both the uncanny and the practical. Pragmatism, in its Emersonian lineage, remembers both the wildness of the signs and tokens around us and the massively practical fact that we must find ways to get on with business. Dewey and Habermas know the latter but generally forget the former, an obliv- ion that stains their vision of democracy through dialogue.

### Spectacularization Turn-

#### Action by lepers is key to resolving rights issues. They read the leprosy aff to make a spectacle of the Leper for the Ballot

ILA 18 (International Leprosy Association, “Leprosy as Metaphor,” Date is copyright date, http://leprosyhistory.org/impact/leprosy-as-a-metaphor)

In addition to the burden of the historical representation of leprosy, the disease itself destabilised all the usual visual markers of identity, changing one’s physical appearance. M. leprae, the mycobacterium that causes leprosy, enters and damages the peripheral nerves, and before effective medication, the parts of the body that define it and distinguish it, were irrevocably disfigured. The face is particularly important in establishing identity and individuality, and it was often the face that most revealed the damage that leprosy could do. The nose could be affected, eyes clouded over and sight was lost, eyebrows disappeared, the skin thickened with nodules and the quality of the voice would change. Hands and feet were also progressively damaged as a result of repeated injuries to the fingers and toes arising from the loss of sensation that came about from damage to the peripheral nerves. As leprosy was a disfiguring disease, the loss of physical identity was accompanied by a sense of loss of essential identity, of “humanity” and consequently of legal identity. Carole Rawcliffe notes that although the application of legislation varied and the law was a constantly evolving process, “Anyone who seemed so deformed and terrible of aspect that he or she had to be “put out of the community of mankind” thereby forfeited his or her rights to plead inherit and to make contracts of any kind. (Rawcliffe 271) As Rawcliffe and, before her, Mary Douglas indicates, “official attempts to separate presumed lepers [sic] from society tended to occur during periods of crisis, when concerns about epidemic disease, disorder and vagrancy were running high.”\*1 People with leprosy functioned as trigger points for social frustration, and in the battle for autonomy over their bodies, they could usually only rely on their own efforts to obtain justice. \*2

### Essentialism Turn/CAP LINK

#### They ignore the experience of the leper and how it affects those of class and ethnicity differently

ILA 18 (International Leprosy Association, “Leprosy as Metaphor,” Date is copyright date, http://leprosyhistory.org/impact/leprosy-as-a-metaphor)

Leprosy also differentiated on the basis of social standing and ethnicity. Leprosy robbed people of their social and their economic status, but the wealthy were often permitted to stay at home instead of entering an asylum, while those who had no resources had no choice but to surrender their liberty. Immigrant labourers were especially targeted for the presence of the disease. For example, the Chinese and Polynesians and Melanesians underwent regular physical examination for leprosy in the colony of Queensland.

#### They essentialism the history of the leper ignoring how it effects different cultures, races, and sexes

Edmond, 06 (Rod, a native of Atlanta, Georgia, is a founding partner of Edmond & Jones, LLP, and serves as the firm's managing partner, “Leprosy and Empire”, p 1-6, 2006, <https://the-eye.eu/public/WorldTracker.org/College%20Books/Cambridge%20University%20Press/0521865840.Cambridge.University.Press.Leprosy.and.Empire.A.Medical.and.Cultural.History.Jan.2007.pdf>, Accessed: 6/22/18, JY)

The association of leprosy and sex also occurs widely across different cultures and periods. According to Chinese legend leprosy was a divine punishment for necrophilia.29 The idea that leprosy was a scourge for sexual licence recurs in parts of Africa where it was associated with incest.30 In Marquesan society contact with menstruating women was believed to cause leprosy.31 The German ethno- grapher Gunterh Tessmann described in Die Pangwe (1913) how in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon the active partner in male anal intercourse was thought to risk contracting leprosy.32 Each of these random examples has its own cultural and historical specificity, but taken together they indicate broader patterns of response to the disease across cultures and through time. In the modern colonial period leprosy was racialised as well as sexual- ised.

### Orientalism Turn

#### Orientalism Turn- They ignore how leprosy is rooted in orientalism, addressing orientalism is inherently key when addressing leprosy

ILA 18 (International Leprosy Association, “Leprosy as Metaphor,” Date is copyright date, http://leprosyhistory.org/impact/leprosy-as-a-metaphor)

In The Infections of Thomas de Quincey, John Barrell claims that De Quincey was terrorised by fear of “an unending and interlinked chain of infections from the East, which threatened to enter his system and to overthrow it, leaving him visibly and permanently ‘compromised’ and orientalised” (15). De Quincey’s fears were not literally diseases, but they were envisaged as such: “The ‘oriental leprosy’, ‘oriental cholera’, ‘oriental typhus fever’, the ‘plague of Cairo’, the ‘cancerous kisses’ of the Egyptian crocodile: the fear and hatred projected on to the East kept threatening to return in one such form or another …” (16) These disease threats, metaphors for an orientalism that was perceived as threatening to swamp the vulnerable Imperial self, were irrevocably entangled in involutes of personal associations, guilt, and fear. A disease, which was perceived as quite literally “Oriental” in origin, but also with the potential to make utterly “Other,” to Orientalise, could only indicate vast reservoirs of fear and anxiety in the society which organised itself to recognise, contain, and incarcerate it.

### Impact/A2: Skills Inev

#### Situating their Aff relative to the law is the worst of both worlds—if they’re right and skills are inevitable, they only guarantee that they’re used for evil, but academic discussions outside of policy debate solve all their offense

CARRINGTON 1984 (Paul, former dean of Duke University Law School, “Of Law and the River,” Journal of Legal Education 34, 7/18/18)

Moreover, there is dread in disbelief. A lawyer who succumbs to legal nihilism faces a far greater danger than mere professional incompetence. He must contemplate the dreadful reality of government by cunning and a society which the only right is might. Such a fright can sustain belief in many that **law is at least possible and must matter**.

The professionalism and intellectual courage of lawyers does not require rejection of Legal Realism and its lesson that who decides also matters. What it cannot abide is the embrace of nihilism and its lesson that who decides is everything, and principle nothing but cosmetic. Persons espousing the latter view, however honestly held, have a substantial ethical problem as teachers of professional law students. The nihilist teacher threatens to rob his or her students of the courage to act on such professionalism judgment as they may have acquired. Teaching cynicism may, and perhaps probably does, result in the learning of the skills of corruption: bribery and intimidation. In an honest effort to proclaim a need for revolution, nihilist teachers are more likely to train **crooks than radicals**. If this risk is correctly appraised, the nihilist who must profess that legal principle does not matter **has an ethical duty** to **depart the law school**, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the academy.

This is a hard dictum within a university, whose traditions favor the inclusion in house of all honestly held ideas, beliefs, and values. When, however, the university accepted **responsibility for training** professionals, it also accepted a duty to constrain teaching that knowingly dispirits students or disables them from doing the work for which they are trained. And even the nihilist must eventually recognize that professional law students are infertile ground for the seed of anarchy; within institutions such as professional law schools, **nihilism is a doomed testament**. Elsewhere, such teaching may find an audience, but not among those who have set their hands to **perform the world’s work**.

### A2: Words Don’t Mean Things

#### Words don’t need objective meaning—the process of this debate is a negotiation to an intersubjective consensus which makes them key in conversation

FERGUSON AND MANSBACH 2002 (Yale, Prof of IR at Rutgers, Richard, Prof of IR at Iowa State, International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis, 7/18/18)

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

#### Declaring that language is meaningless is a self-fulfilling prophecy—they ignore the socially mediated effectiveness of language by developing an inaccessible vocabulary and then declaring it inaccessible

SCRUTON 1993 (Roger Scruton is Professor of Aesthetics at Birkbeck College, University of London, “Against Deconstruction,” Cultural Notes, no. 32. Gendered language is left intact here in the assumption that it refers to Jacques Derrida, mentioned in the preceding paragraph)

Deconstructive criticism does not admit the collusive standpoint of the common reader. It prefers to deny his existence. That is what it means to say that reading is impossible. Such criticism therefore makes no distinction between meaning and association, between the arbitrary and the relevant. It is an exercise in critical narcissism. Consider the derridized version of Blanchot’s ‘L’Arrêt de Mort’. As I said, this title has two clear meanings, which endorse each other and reflect the character of the narrative. (The story, I should say, concerns the courage of a young woman in the face of certain death.) These two meanings are genuine meanings; they are not private associations. Derrida associates the title with a third idea that is, I think, absolutely foreign to it, the idea of a ridge or backbone — arête, in French. He then looks for this ridge in the story. It is not described there: it would add nothing to the meaning if it were. (The word arête is normally used in common speech when cooking or eating fish.) So Derrida concludes that the ridge must be concealed in the structure of the story. It is this structural ridge which is of supreme importance, and which provides the point of departure for the impossible task of reading. There is no admissible distinction between meaning and association, and so nothing that we could say to suggest that he is straying from the point.

Such sideways slithering through associated ideas is in fact wholly characteristic of deconstructive criticism, which treats the text as a pretext, and speaks a private ‘metalanguage’ of its own. The term ‘metalanguage’, now extremely fashionable among critics, is an interesting one. It belongs to the philosophy of logic, and means a language which talks about another language. The implications of the term are, in the present context, fairly clear. The critic is refusing to speak the language of the reader, or of the writer, of poetry. He uses only a metalanguage of his own — a firm stance from which the frailty of readers and writers can be more accurately observed.

#### Their theory of language is only narcissism—it demeans the practice of reading and its intersubjective potential while asserting that there is no authority other than the critic

#### \*\*\*read Carrington as impact\*\*\*\*

SCRUTON 1993 (Roger Scruton is Professor of Aesthetics at Birkbeck College, University of London, “Against Deconstruction,” Cultural Notes, no. 32, 7/18/18)

But there is a penalty to pay for that. The language of the critic has become private, since anything is permitted by its rules. Any association, any technicality, can be presented as though it were a contribution to the meaning of the whole. You, the common reader, do not share this language. Therefore you are in no position to know whether what is said is meaningful or true. But that only means that the private language of the deconstructive critic creates the distance that it pretends to discover, the distance between text and meaning. Why, then, should it have been invented, and why have so many critics been persuaded to adopt it?

I can think of an answer, but it is not a pleasant one. A language which rids literature of meaning alienates the reader from literature. He is therefore free to bestow his attention upon the critic. But the critic is glamourized by his ‘metalanguage’, since it seems to be a repository of knowledge that the reader is despised for lacking and unable to acquire. In denying literature, criticism thereby affirms itself. It begins to seem indispensable.

The critical metalanguage is, then, an expression of the will to power. To understand meaning requires patience and humility, while to revel in association is to release the inner man. It is to accept no authority that is not self-imposed; it is to grow in stature and immunity. As private association takes precedence over public meaning, so does the art of reading shrink into nothingness. And as the reader feels smaller, so does the critic loom large.

#### Language isn’t arbitrary—it’s systematic and predictable

MONAGHAN et al 2014 (Padraic Monaghan, Centre for Research in Human Development and Learning, Department of Psychology, Lancaster University; Richard C. Shillcock, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh; Morten H. Christiansen, Department of Psychology, Cornell; Simon Kirby, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, “How arbitrary is language?” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, <http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1651/20130299>, 7/18/18)

In contrast to the view of the arbitrariness of the sign, there are a growing number of corpus analyses and behavioural studies that demonstrate some systematicity in spoken language. For some features of meaning, such as vowel quality relating to size, the sound-symbolic properties are language-universal [6,7,9]; for instance, the non-words ‘mil’ and ‘mal’ are typically understood to express small and large, respectively, across cultures. High and low vowel contrasts, exemplified by the i/a distinction, have also been shown to occur in small/large expressives, respectively, across most, if not all, languages [14]. There are also numerous language-specific properties, such as phonoaesthemes, that refer to clusters of phonemes relating to specific meanings. For example, in English, words associated with the nose and its functions tend to begin with sn-, or words referring to light often begin with gl- [6]. Preferences for certain sound–meaning relationships, have been demonstrated to affect learning of novel adjectives [15], verbs [16,17], nouns [18,19] and mixes thereof [20], though these studies generally test a forced choice between two alternatives. When the semantic distinction is not immediately available, as in a forced-choice test between two objects from different categories, then learning is less evident but still present under some learning conditions [21].

#### Language is systematic, not arbitrary—words really mean things

MONAGHAN et al 2014 (Padraic Monaghan, Centre for Research in Human Development and Learning, Department of Psychology, Lancaster University; Richard C. Shillcock, School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh; Morten H. Christiansen, Department of Psychology, Cornell; Simon Kirby, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, “How arbitrary is language?” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, <http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1651/20130299>, 7/18/18)

We have shown that the sound–meaning mapping is not entirely arbitrary, but that systematicity is more pronounced in early language acquisition than in later vocabulary development. This seems to conflict with the ‘design feature’ and Saussurian view of the arbitrariness of the sign [1,2], the dominant view throughout the past century of language science, which contends that form–meaning mappings are arbitrary. Some systematicity may be anticipated from the morphological structure of the vocabulary—we know that derivational and inflectional morphology carries information about words' usage and can indicate certain features of meaning [43], such as the distinction between nouns and verbs, or the tense of the action being described, or the relationship between the length of morpheme and the quantity implied by comparatives and superlatives (e.g. long, longer, longest) [51]. However, even for the monomorphemic words, when morphology was not exerting an influence on the sound–meaning mappings, the vocabulary is more systematic than expected by chance. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that the observed systematicity is also not due to common historical roots for words. For monomorphemic words with no shared etymological origin, there is greater systematicity than expected by chance.

The analyses of the landscape of the form–meaning mappings demonstrated that systematicity in the vocabulary is not a consequence of small clusters of sound symbolism, rather, it is a general property of the whole language. Systematicity, then, is not a consequence of small exceptional clusters of form–meaning correlation, which could have indicated that the structure of the vocabulary is affected or has been altered by specific isolated features of sound relating to meaning. Instead, the general property of systematicity indicates that the vocabulary is more likely to be configured by principles that apply across the whole language.

### A2: All Language Trope (e.g., psychoanalysis, deconstruction)

#### Meaning is a publicly negotiated consensus about language—identifying trope presupposes that some literal communication is possible and doesn’t foreclose the possibility of meaning

SCRUTON 1993 (Roger Scruton is Professor of Aesthetics at Birkbeck College, University of London, “Against Deconstruction,” Cultural Notes, no. 32, 7/18/18)

The fundamental idea behind deconstructive criticism seems to be this: figurative language closes the door between the reader and the meaning. We must open the door, with the Yale key provided. But it seems to me most odd to believe that the door is locked. Figures of speech are open to their meaning. They are vivid, immediate, unambiguous. They are used all the time, and indeed clichés are composed of them. A sly fox, a loving heart, a sullen anger, a serious face — all those are figures of speech. Some seem more figurative than others. But they are all figurative (in the literal sense of the term). They transfer a word from the context which provides its meaning to a context where its meaning is exploited in some novel way. You might think that figures of speech must therefore bear a double meaning. But that is not so. The literal meaning is usually lost in the transfer. When I read ‘His heart was in his mouth’, the literal sense of the words does not occur to me. If I understand them literally I shall be guilty of a misreading. Sometimes, it is true, a writer can play with figures of speech so as to trap us into a literal reading. And the effect of this might be very powerful. It might seem as though a reality were being displayed behind the commonplace. Consider the effect produced by Geoffrey Hill when, in describing the search for the bodies of drowned men, he suddenly forces us to literalize the metaphor ‘scraping home’:

Quietly they wade the disturbed shore;

Gather their dead as the first dead scrape home.

But if a figure of speech can be given this kind of impact this is because it does not normally possess it. The figures I have mentioned are no more inherently ambiguous than literal descriptions.

THE MEANING THAT IS THERE

There is a moral that I wish to draw from those observations. Meaning, it seems to me, is a collusive activity. It requires speakers, hearers, and the social context which permits understanding. The reader brings to literature an experience of language which the writer cannot ignore: the meaning of a text is the meaning which a speaker of the language can find in it, and this is as true of Finnegan’s Wake as it is of Gulliver’s Travels. If criticism seeks to elucidate meaning it is elucidating something public and publicly accessible. It must therefore presuppose a reader for the text which it purports to analyse, and it must direct its remarks towards that reader. The critic may guide the reader, but he cannot dictate to him, since the critic’s words, like the words he studies, gain their significance from the public practice of speech. This practice defines the reader of literature. The ‘common reader’ to whom I have referred is the reader who conveys to the text the accumulated meanings of the language. Criticism that is not addressed to the common reader strays from its point, losing sight of language and literature together.

### A2: Resentment

#### It's not a test of strength or power unless you overcome a capable opponent—our framework impacts turn resentment

HATAB 2002 (Lawrence, Old Dominion University, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon : Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans,” Journal of Nietzsche Studies, Fall, 7/18/18)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent. As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest. And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contest. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work.

## Antiblackness

### Links

#### Blackness exists in an ontological state of exception—biopolitics assume a humanist subject upon which life is managed

Warren 16 (Calvin Warren, 2016, assistant professor in WGSS at Emory, PhD in African American/American Studies from Yale, Black Interiority, Freedom, and the Impossibility of Living, Nineteenth-Century Contexts, 38:2, 107-121, DOI: 10.1080/08905495.2016.1135769)//SJK \*\*language-modified

Mbembe considers slavery as “one of the ﬁrst instances of bio-political experimentation” (21),but since bio-politics assumes a humanism in which “life” and “death” have semantic integrity and conceptual meaning and the human is its primary subject, the black within an anti-black order is not a bio-political subject. The aim of antebellum bio-politics—and the development of nineteenth-century vital statistics, census, and epidemiology—is not to manage black “life,” to make the subject live on and manipulate the conditions of this living, but to expel blacks from the very terms of “life” and “death” all together so that they are placed in a semantic realm in which these terms no longer have distinction or meaning.3 Bio-politics depends on this exception to exercise control of its citizens, but it is not concerned with managing the life of the excluded, but fostering forms of death-life. For blacks, the plantation, as the ultimate form of anti-black sovereignty in our imaginary, is not conﬁned to a particular space, but it is the condition of black death-life in modernity. The world is a plantation for blacks. Whether “free” or captive, blacks are subjected to the technologies of pulverization, the forced choice between physical, mental, and social death, and the permanent exclusion from human-beingness in whatever space they inhabit. The captive, indeed, is “kept alive but in a state of injury, in a phantom like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity” (21), as Mbembe suggests, but the “state of injury” runs much deeper than physical abuse, torture, and violation. It is the ontological violence that preconditions the physical torment of the whip, the canine patrol, the knife, and the gun. This form of violence situates blacks outside the traditional terms of humanism and into the realm we might describe as the “ontological state of exception.” Neither bio-politics nor necropolitics cover this black being in the exception because both discourses presume a “human-being” upon which politics exercises power. Indeed, we might suggest that blacks are placed in a netherworld of conceptual chaos that marks the limits of politics (both bio and necro). It is this conceptual density that gets trafﬁcked into, unknowingly perhaps, the debates about free blacks in antebellum society. The epigraph raises these concerns, without explicitly making bare the existential presumptions about blackness that anchor it. For J.C. Calhoun, freedom for blackness is death, a form of death worse than mere biological expiration—mental death, or ~~insanity~~[irrationality]. Since the human-being names a relationship of care between the “self, ” Being, and its projection into the external world(freedom), claiming that the black is incapable of such care places ~~him~~[them] outside the realm of freedom and into the domain of the unfree, the care-less, and the unthought. But this realm of unfreedom is also a form of “death,” according to Orlando Patterson, because anti-blackness strips the captive of this fundamental existential relationship by objectifying this “self” and presenting this relationship to the captor for his pleasure. Thus, we have a strange play between deaths, deaths reconﬁgured as life, which seems to be the only existential option for blackness in modernity: freedom engenders mental death and unfreedom engenders social death. Because social death is a form of mental death, to the extent that the mind is pulverized by routinized pain and terror, and mental death is a form of social death, to the extent that Consciousness cannot actualize or move throughout the ﬁeld of the social, there is no escaping this condition of “death” as life and “life” as death for Calhoun. “Free Black” names this existential deadlock.

#### “Free black” is a paradox—blackness can never exist within the realm of freedom

Warren 16 (Calvin Warren, 2016, assistant professor in WGSS at Emory, PhD in African American/American Studies from Yale, Black Interiority, Freedom, and the Impossibility of Living, Nineteenth-Century Contexts, 38:2, 107-121, DOI: 10.1080/08905495.2016.1135769)//SJK

What type of life is possible in what Giorgio Agamben would call “the state of exception”?2 Are the terms “life” and “death” even appropriate to describe the condition of the being situated within this ontological lacuna? Theorists have approached these inquiries with unavoidable paradoxes: “social death,”“necro-citizenship,”“living corpse,” and “living dead,” just to name a few. The antebellum free black—a being situated between slave and citizen, human and property, political death and social life, and subject and object—constitutes such an exception for antebellum U.S.society. Writing about the antebellum free black raises particular theoretical and philosophical problems, since the humanist grammars of being and existence fracture around the “free black” and endlessly encircle it with paradoxes, contradictions, and puzzles. The juxtaposition of “free” and “black” collides two disparate grammars into chaotic signiﬁcation and conceptual devastation: “freedom” is the terrain of the living, of the being we call “human,” and “black” is the territory of existential dread, nonfreedom, and the being we might call “object.” With the term “free black,” we are forced into a permutation of conceptual ground that is unstable, and it desiccates beneath itself as a self-consuming oxymoron. Within this grammatical, syntactical, and conceptual chaos, even the terms “life” and death” must be reconﬁgured and reorganized to capture the being situated within this space. Indeed, what does it mean to “live” or to “die” when one’s living is a form of death, and one’s death is a gift of life? Because biology does not exhaust the ﬁelds of life and death, the problem at hand is more profound than we can imagine, especially when we analyze the condition of being that we call “blackness.”

## AT: Kristeva

#### The author is Orientalist, reject the argument at face value

**Morrison 16** [Refiguring Kristeva and Irigaray in the Buddhist Intellectual Tradition by Barbara Morrison Utsunomiya State University, International Culture, Faculty Member 2016 https://www.academia.edu/7780595/Kristeva\_and\_Butler]

Kristeva discloses to Clement that she has “a hunger for Chinese sacredness, composed of sexual duality, of the establishment of action, and of an efficacy that draws its strength from the void” and that she “tried to learn Chinese once in an attempt to accede to that sacred” because she “liked that taste, bland perhaps but very subtle, of the sacred: so far removed from that other so-called sacred that cuts the throats of men and women as if they were sheep” (168). Kristeva relates to Clement that she “even managed to earn my bachelor’s degree in it” and went to China with the Tel Quel group where she once again was “seduced by the serene maturity of Chinese women…and disappointed by the national Communism that was challenging the Stalinist model but still followed it intrinsically” (170). As her “own history became mixed up in all that” … she … “turned her back on politics. Hence psychoanalysis , the novel, and the rest” (170). Kristeva goes on to “admit that, in the long history of ‘sacreds,’ I allow myself to be seduced first and foremost by the flavors of the Tao, which, as everyone knows, suits a sage reconciled with the mother and with nature, ‘the one who alone is nourished by the mother,’ and who has nothing to defy or to demonstrate or to prove…”

## Bad Metaphor

#### Turn: using the leper as a metaphor for the abject is offensive and stigmatizing – reverses recent progress

Narsappa et al ‘13, Vagavathali Narsappa is Chairman of the Association of People Affected by Leprosy, Kofi Nyarko is the President of IDEA Ghana, P.K. Gopal is the President of IDEA India, Leulseged Berhane is the President of the Ethiopian National Association of Persons Affected by Leprosy (ENAPAL), Jaime Garzon is the Executive Director of Corsohansen Colombia, Cristiano Torres is the Vice National Coordinator of Movimento de Reintegração das Pessoas Atingidas pela Hanseníase (MORHAN) in Brazil, Paulus Manek is the National Chairman of Perhimpunan Mandiri Kusta Indonesia (PerMaTa), Indonesia, Miyoji Morimoto is the Chairman of IDEA Japan, Lee Gil-yong is the President of Korean Federation of Hansen Associations in Korea, José Ramirez Jr. is the Coordinator for the International Association for Integration Dignity and Economic Advancement (IDEA) in the USA, Yohei Sasakawa is the WHO Goodwill Ambassador for Leprosy Elimination Chairman from The Nippon Foundation, “Joint Appeal Letter to His Holiness Pope Francis,” The Nippon Foundation, Accessed 7/5/18 https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=1d63953a-11ef-41ec-b187-f08761c3ae3f

For at least 4,000 years, leprosy has been one of the world’s most misunderstood and stigmatizing diseases. Over the centuries, countless millions affected by leprosy have been ostracized by their fellow human beings in the belief that the disease is highly contagious, disabling, untreatable, and even a form of divine punishment. Thanks to modern chemotherapy, leprosy – also known as Hansen’s disease – is completely curable today. It is only mildly communicable. With early diagnosis and treatment, leprosy is not physically disabling. But the disease is disabling in other ways because of the cruel stigma. There is no reason to isolate people from society, force them from their homes and places of work or prevent them from going to school because of leprosy. Unfortunately, old perceptions of the disease die hard and are reinforced by stigmatizing language. The offensive term “leper” used to describe someone with the disease also carries the meaning of an outcast, sinner or a person who is rejected by others for moral or social reasons. Such terminology contributes to the discrimination that people affected by leprosy face and discourages those in need of treatment from seeking help. It is particularly upsetting when these stigmatizing labels are used in front of young people, whose impressions are formed at an early age. Using the disease as a metaphor for corruption or sin also perpetuates deeply ingrained stereotypes and makes it harder to alleviate the devastating social, economic and psychological impact that leprosy can have – and it is in this context that we, the undersigned, address this letter to you. We have noted your use of the word “leprosy” in recent months to label aspects of the Church that you seek to reform, such as when you said that “careerism is a leprosy” and “the court is the leprosy of the papacy.” While we are sure this was not your intention, using the term “leprosy” to denote something negative or undesirable undermines efforts to eliminate the stigma associated with the disease and to enable people affected by leprosy to live in dignity free from discrimination. We respectfully request that you refrain from this usage in future. At the same time, we would warmly welcome a strong call by the Catholic Church on the occasion of World Leprosy Day 2014 for an end to stigma and discrimination against people affected by leprosy – including the use of discriminatory language – and we look to you with anticipation for such a message. All of us are ready to join forces with Your Holiness to attack the labels that perpetuate stigma. Thank you for considering this appeal, which comes from the hearts of millions of people affected by leprosy and their families around the world.

## Disease DA

### links

#### Leprosy is in abundance along the Mexican border – lifting a restriction on medical screening leaves the disease to spread unchecked.

FAIR, March 2009, Federation for American Immigration Reform is a public interest organization of concerned Americans, united in the belief that our immigration policies and laws should again serve the nation’s future needs, “Illegal Immigration and Public Health”, https://www.fairus.org/issue/societal-impact/illegal-immigration-and-public-health

The impact of immigration on our public health is often overlooked. Although millions of visitors for tourism and business come every year, the foreign population of special concern is illegal residents, who come most often from countries with endemic health problems and less developed health care. They are of greatest consequence because they are responsible for a disproportionate share of serious public health problems, are living among us for extended periods of time, and often are dependent on U.S. health care services. Because illegal immigrants, unlike those who are legally admitted for permanent residence, undergo no medical screening to assure that they are not bearing contagious diseases, the rapidly swelling population of illegal aliens in our country has also set off a resurgence of contagious diseases that had been totally or nearly eradicated by our public health system. According to Dr. Laurence Nickey, director of the El Paso heath district “Contagious diseases that are generally considered to have been controlled in the United States are readily evident along the border ... The incidence of tuberculosis in El Paso County is twice that of the U.S. rate. Dr. Nickey also states that leprosy, which is considered by most Americans to be a disease of the Third World, is readily evident along the U.S.-Mexico border and that dysentery is several times the U.S. rate ... People have come to the border for economic opportunities, but the necessary sewage treatment facilities, public water systems, environmental enforcement, and medical care have not been made available to them, causing a severe risk to health and well being of people on both sides of the border.”1 A June, 2009 article in the New England Journal of Medicine noted that a majority (57.8%) of all new cases of tuberculosis in the United States in 2007 were diagnosed in foreign-born persons. The TB infection rate among foreign-born persons was 9.8 times as high as that among U.S.-born persons.2 The article documents the medical testing process for TB required of immigrants and refugees, and this points to foreigners who are unscreened, especially the illegal alien population as the logical source of this disproportionate rate of TB incidence. It should also be kept in mind that among U.S. citizens who contract TB their exposure to the disease may well have come from exposure to a non-U.S. citizen. “The pork tapeworm, which thrives in Latin America and Mexico, is showing up along the U.S. border, threatening to ravage victims with symptoms ranging from seizures to death. ... The same [Mexican] underclass has migrated north to find jobs on the border, bringing the parasite and the sickness—cysticercosis—its eggs can cause[.] Cysts that form around the larvae usually lodge in the brain and destroy tissue, causing hallucinations, speech and vision problems, severe headaches, strokes, epileptic seizures, and in rare cases death.”3 The problem, however, is not confined to the border region, as illegal immigrants have rapidly spread across the country into many new economic sectors such as food processing, construction, and hospitality services. Typhoid struck Silver Spring, Maryland, in 1992 when an immigrant from the Third World (who had been working in food service in the United States for almost two years) transmitted the bacteria through food at the McDonald’s where she worked. River blindness, malaria, and guinea worm, have all been brought to Northern Virginia by immigration.4

#### Legal immigration to the U.S. is contingent on passing medical exams – the aff removes leprosy from those practices which increase the likelihood of the spread of contagious diseases

Souther Medical Association, February 18, 2015, A research institution focused on improving quality of patient care through multidisciplinary, interprofessional education, “Illegal Immigration and the Threat of Infectious Disease”, https://sma.org/illegal-immigration-and-the-threat-of-infectious-disease/

There's a growing health concern over illegal immigrants bringing infectious diseases into the United States. Approximately 500,000 legal immigrants and 80,000 refugees come to the United States each year, and an additional 700,000 illegal immigrants enter annually, and three-quarters of these illegal immigrants come from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Legal immigrants and refugees are required to have a medical examination for migration to the United States, while they are still overseas. This is the responsibility of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which provide instructions to the Panel Physicians who conduct the medical exams. The procedure consists of a physical examination, an evaluation (skin test/chest x-ray examination) for tuberculosis (TB), and blood test for syphilis. Requirements for vaccination are based on recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. Individuals who fail the exam due to certain health-related conditions are not admitted to the United States. Such conditions include drug addiction or communicable diseases of public health significance such as TB, syphilis, gonorrhoea, leprosy, and a changing list of current threats such as polio, cholera, diphtheria, smallpox, or severe acute respiratory syndromes. Illegal immigrants crossing into the United States could bring any of these threats, however. Southern Texas Border Patrol agent Chris Cabrera warns: "What's coming over into the US could harm everyone. We are starting to see scabies, chicken pox, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections, and different viruses." Illegal immigration may expose Americans to diseases that have been virtually eradicated, but are highly contagious, as in the case of TB. This disease rose by 20% globally from 1985 to 1991, and was declared a worldwide emergency by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1995. Furthermore, TB frequently occurs in connection with the human immunodeficiency virus. Fortunately, more than 90% of Central Americans are vaccinated against TB, according to the WHO. The federal government's Department of Homeland Security has public health controls in place to minimize any possible health risks, including medical units at the busiest border stations and measures to protect Customs and Border Protection including gloves, long-sleeve shirts, and frequent hand washing. In addition, the CDC’s Division of Global Migration and Quarantine has measures in place to protect the population from communicable diseases. The agency works through a variety of activities to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases in the United States. It operates Quarantine Stations at ports of entry; establishes standards for medical examination of persons headed legally for the United States; and administers interstate and foreign quarantine regulations governing the international and interstate movement of humans, animals, and cargo. The agency also alerts state authorities of newly arrived immigrants with certain health conditions. The CDC's Epidemiology Team also monitors infectious diseases among immigrants and refugees with their disease surveillance systems, investigations of disease outbreaks, and their Migrant Serum Bank of anonymous immigrant and refugee blood samples available for research. Other branches of the CDC protect US health through ensuring the quality of overseas medical exams required of immigrants and refugees. Concerns have been specifically raised about children, due to the risk of infections spreading in public schools. But the CDC currently believes that the children arriving at US borders "pose little risk of spreading infectious diseases to the general public." The CDC also confirms that vaccinations are provided to all children who do not have valid documentation. All children are initially screened for visible and obvious health issues (for example, lice, rashes, diarrhea, and cough) when they first arrive at Customs and Border Protection facilities.

## Cap K

### Class Focus Key/Discourse Bad

Cloud’01 |Dana Cloud, Communications professor at UT, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, 2001. <http://ac-journal.org/journal/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm|>KZaidi

Poststructuralist discourse theory and the discursive turn offer several worthwhile cautions to traditional ideology critics. Namely, (1) it is important for rhetorical critics of any stripe to retain a capacity for surprise and discovery; (2) one cannot assume that texts automatically and entirely reflect the interests or subject positions of their creators; and (3) we cannot claim to know in advance of close attention to particular cases what the balance of dominance and resistance, discipline and emancipation might be in any given formation. However, I believe that such complexity and nuance were always already available in the classical materialist tradition, which has been unfortunately rendered as an Althusserian straw person in contemporary rhetorical and cultural studies.

Gramsci’s (1971/1936) prison writings, for example, explore both how fascism’s discourse was persuasive and how oppositional blocs can come to consciousness and act in their better interests. The concept of hegemony, usually defined as the mechanisms by which dominant groups obtain the "consent" of the masses (p. 12), has another side to it. In "The Modern Prince," Gramsci (1971/1936, pp. 166-67) suggests that the analysis of hegemony is also the examination of the social content, resources, demands, strategies, and balance of forces in oppositional social movements, which for Gramsci required the mobilization of the economic clout of organized workers.

Gramsci was a materialist, a Marxist, and a revolutionary. Today, there is a neat trick of doublespeak in taking what he would have recognized as philosophical idealism--an almost entirely text-centered practice disconnected from economic contextualization--and renaming it "materialism," perhaps for the sake of progressive credibility, perhaps out of a set of misunderstandings about what the historical materialist tradition put forward. In a less generous moment, we might regard poststructuralist theories themselves as a kind of ideological mystification, borrowing the label "materialism" for a project that, in reality, encourages pessimism, ineffectual micropolitics, and retreat from explanation and struggle.

The Retreat from Class

At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them.

In poststructuralist discourse theory, the "retreat from class" (Wood, 1999) expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure at the level of the economy and the state. It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999).

Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates.

Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8).

In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact encourage scholars and/as activists to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41).

#### Tag you’re it

**Flexner 12** [An Institution that was a Village: Archaeology and Social Life in the Hansen's Disease Settlement at Kalawao, Moloka'i, Hawaii Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 135-163 by James L. Flexner is currently lecturer in historical archaeology and heritage at the University of Sydney. James holds a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, awarded for research on the archaeology of the Hawaiian leprosarium on Moloka‘i. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41410916]

The state was constantly struggling to provide sufficient food, clean drinking water, clothing, shelter, and other necessities to the population in Kalawao (Greene 1985; Korn 1976). This led to conflict between the state bureaucracy and the Kalawao community about the appropriate use of time and resources because the goal of self-sufficiency was never met. The initial solution to these problems was a rationing system, in which exiles were provided with rations of pa 7 'ai (a hard paste used to make the staple food poi , a greyish-purple pudding made of cooked taro), beef, salmon and rice, as well as clothing. Eventually, this model was replaced by one in which rations were supplemented with a cash allowance that could be used in the Board of Health-run store (Greene 1985). Capitalism was an integral part of the creation of the institution, as foreigners saw the leprosy problem as detrimental to commerce (Moran 2007). At the same time, capitalism became an integral part of everyday life in Kalawao, and evidence for consumer choice is spread throughout the archaeological remains of the leprosarium.